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Local studies have much to contribute to the study of the history 
of public health reform in nineteenth-century Britain. They may 
help elucidate the shifting margins between competition and 
complementarity in the efforts of local and national government. 
They can offer a corrective to hasty generalization from narrow, 
usually London-based, sources. They throw light upon the 
implementation of legislation and upon the local negotiation of 
the ideas and strategies of medical and political elites. It is 
equally important, however, that local studies remain aware of 
the national context of the issues being examined. Otherwise, 
the specific significance of the local study will be lost.
In the case of Dr William Henry Duncan, Liverpool's 
Medical Officer of Health from 1847 until his death in 1863, 
his national significance is obvious. He was the first full-time 
Medical Officer of Health in England and made important 
contributions to the public health campaigns associated with 
Edwin Chadwick in the 1840s. In some ways, he almost slips 
from national view shortly after his appointment and, 
preoccupied with local issues perhaps, he left it to others, and 
most dramatically John Simon, to define the image and the 
framework of the position of Medical Officer of Health. The 
curtain seems to fall upon his national role even before his 
apparent mentor, Chadwick, has been hauled off-stage with 
the reconstruction of the General Board of Health in 1855. Yet
*See acknowledgements on p. 115.
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Duncan remained the Medical Officer of Health in England's 
second largest city for fifteen years and stayed remarkably 
faithful to his early vision of environmental public health. 
Furthermore, there were a number of other strategies and 
commitments handed on from the 1840s across the baton- 
change from Chadwick to Simon in 1855, not only in the ideas 
and practice of Simon himself, but also in those of a cohort of 
environmental health activists who had been socialized into the 
earlier public health movement. William Farr, John Sutherland, 
and Florence Nightingale were among the most prominent but 
there were many more working for local governments up and 
down the country. Duncan was one of these.
It is important, then, to explore the relations between the 
ideas and practice of these foot soldiers and those of their 
generals in the public health movement. Duncan's approach to 
and reflections on cholera open an interesting window on these 
questions. Liverpool was unquestionably one of the worst hit 
cities in England's cholera epidemics and cholera was without 
doubt one of the most dramatic of the perils which shaped 
contemporaries' vision of the shock cities of their age. To a 
certain extent, cholera has been taken by historians, as it was by 
some contemporaries, as the paradigmatic epidemic threat to 
the nineteenth-century industrial city. Certainly, Chadwick and 
other public health activists sought to use fear and concern over 
cholera as a lever for wedging free sanitary reform from local 
and national authorities. It is equally clear that the middle-class 
press, at least, was complicit in this effort to show cholera as the 
great teacher of the evils of sanitary abuses. Yet an examination 
of Duncan's reactions to cholera reveals a number of divergences 
from the picture of the environmental public health movement 
which might be reconstructed from the work of Chadwick and 
colleagues at the General Board of Health. In some respects, his 
experience of fighting cholera undermined Duncan's confidence 
in certain aspects of Chadwick's version of the 'sanitary idea' 
without in any way preparing him to accept Simon's.
I
There were four cholera epidemics in England and Wales during 
the nineteenth century: in 1831-2, 1848-9, 1853-4, and 1866.
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On each occasion, the rate of mortality among the people of 
Liverpool was high. Table 1, in spite of any qualifications one 
might urge against the accuracy of the diagnoses of cause of death 
on which it is based, 1 clearly shows the degree to which Liverpool 
was one of the distinctive cholera localities. 2 Although these rates 
of mortality pale alongside the worst figures for cities on the 
Continent which sometimes reached levels ten times higher than 
the worst English cities, 3 the national significance of Liverpool is 
clear in both relative and absolute terms and it certainly earned its 
reputation as 'the black spot on the Mersey'. 4 In the first 
epidemic, Liverpool accounted for one in fourteen of all English 
cholera deaths, one in ten in the second, one in seventeen in the 
third and one in seven of the last and mildest epidemic. The rate 
of cholera mortality in Liverpool during the second epidemic, 
when about one in seventy of the population of Liverpool died,
For a discussion of the reliability of cholera registration see G. Kearns, 
Urban epidemics and historical geography: cholera in London 1848-9 (Norwich, 
1985).
The materials for England and Wales, excluding London, during the first 
(1831-2) epidemic come from the records of the first Central Board of 
Health (P.R.O., PC 1/108, 'Cholera returns in Great Britain'), and the 
data for London (1832-3) come from the General Board of Health's 
report on the second epidemic (PE 1850 [1275] xxi, p. 365, 'Report of 
the General Board of Health on the Epidemic Cholera of 1848 and 
1849. Appendix B', p. 30). The latter three epidemics are detailed in W. 
Farr, Report on the cholera epidemic of 1866 in England. Supplement to the 29th 
Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages in England 
(London, 1868); also published as P.P 1867-8 (4072) xxxviii, p. 1. The 
population returns come from the published volumes of the decennial 
censuses and they have been interpolated to give an estimate of the 
population in each place during the cholera years. For further details of 
this analysis see G. Kearns, 'Aspects of cholera, society and space in 
nineteenth-century England and Wales' (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge 
Univ., 1985).
See G. Kearns, 'Death in the time of cholera', Journal of Historical 
Geography, XV (1989), pp. 425-432.
An epithet coined by Abraham Hume, a nineteenth-century Liverpool 
clergyman. It is important to place the Liverpool cholera epidemics in some 
sort of comparative context if only to avoid the flights of exaggeration to 
which even such excellent local historians as Eric Midwinter are 
occasionally given: (writing of the 1849 cholera epidemic in Liverpool) 'No 
more dreadful sickness has ever so affected a town as hundreds died weekly 
through a long summer and into the early autumn' (E. Midwinter, Old 
Liverpool (Newton Abbot, 1971), p. 85).
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TABLE 1 Mortality from cholera and other causes (death rates per 1,000 
persons living)
1832 1849 1854 1866
Liverpool
Population
Cholera deaths
Cholera death rate
Other deaths
Other death rate
196,212
1,523
7.76
388,159
5,308
13.68
12,532
32.29
433,814
1,290
2.97
13,507
31.14
360,563
1,989
3.74
20,261
38.09
Manchester
Population 
Cholera deaths 
Cholera death rate 
Other deaths 
Other death rate
Remainder of the North- West 
Population 
Cholera deaths 
Cholera death rate 
Other deaths 
Other death rate
188,609
1,144
6.07
417,121
1,395
3.34
12,604
30.22
461,604
63
0.14
13,890
30.09
553,790
114
0.21
17,101
30.88
1,325,407
281
0.21
1,590,785
2,133
1.34
36,720
23.08
1,716,076
563
0.32
38,706
22.55
2,229,354
888
0.40
52,915
23.74
London
Population 
Cholera deaths 
Cholera death rate 
Other deaths 
Other death rate
1,687,752
6,356
3.77
2,268,885
14,137
6.23
54,315
23.94
2,479,163
10,738
4.33
63,487
26.51
2,995,833
5,686
1.90
74,767
24.96
Remainder of England and Wales
Population
Cholera deaths
Cholera death rate
Other deaths
Other death rate
10,652,916
12,202
1.15
12,818,096
30,516
2.38
271,500
21.18
13,403,418 15,133,024
9,306 5,803
0.69 0.38
288,893 320,861
21.55 21.20
Note: The areas are as follows. In 1832 Liverpool is the Borough and Parish of Liverpool plus 
Toxieth Park, Manchester is the townships of Manchester and Salford, the Xorth-west comprises ihe 
administrative counties of Lancashire and Cheshire excluding Liverpool and Manchester as just 
defined, and London is the registration division as defined in the 1851 census.
For 1849, 1854, and 1866 all data are for registration areas: Liverpool and West Derby districts; 
Manchester, Salford, and Chorlton districts; the registration counties of Lancashire and Cheshire 
excluding Liverpool and Manchester as just defined; and the London registration division.
Source. The population figures have been interpolated from the decennial census data, 1831-1871.
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was among the highest suffered by any large English city in any of 
the cholera epidemics. From Table 2, we can see that it was only 
exceeded by Newcastle in 1832 (and nearly again in 1854), by 
Hull in 1849, and by Plymouth in 1832. s
TABLE 2 Cholera in the great cities (deaths per 1,000 living!
1832184918541866
London
Liverpool 
Manchester
Birmingham 
Leeds
Bristol
Sheffield
Newcastle
Bradford
Hull
Stoke on Trent
Portsmouth
Brighton 
Preston
Norwich
Sunderland
Merthyr Tydfil 
Bolton
Leicester
Nottingham 
Bath
Stockport 
Oldham
Plymouth
3.77
7.76 
6.07
0.14
5.47
6.60
6.81
18.37
1.29
5.93
1.24
1.69
0 
0.18
2.07
12.60
0.42
0
5.71 
1.22
0.44 
0
13.78
6.23
13.68 
3.34
0.16 
8.05
8.20
1.03
4.20
2.50
20.05
1.85
8.37
3.17 
0.36
0.57
5.38
2.83 
1.11
0.03
0.31 
1.29
0.81 
0.49
17.07
4.33
2.97 
0.14
0.12 
0.29
1.13
0.91
13.45
0.18
0.27
0.11
0.26
0.55 
0.08
2.76
0.55
0.26 
0.13
0.05
0.25 
0
0.16 
0.31
1.07
1.90
3.74 
0.21
0.05 
0.13
0.16
0.11
0.32
0.15
0.17
0.09
1.38
0.17 
0.17
0.04
0.91
0.24 
0.45
0.04
0.03 
0.02
0.16 
0.16
0.20
Note: The areas for the latter three epidemics are made up from the following 
registration districts: Liverpool comprises Liverpool and West Derby; 
Manchester: Salford, Manchester and Chorlton; Birmingham: Norton, 
Birmingham and Ashton; Leeds: Hunslet and Leeds; Bristol: Clifton and 
Bristol; Sheffield: Ecclesall and Sheffield; Newcastle: Newcastle and 
Gateshead; Hull: Sculcoates and Hull. Merthyr Tydfil is not separately 
distinguished in the 1832 returns. The towns are listed in their rank order of 
the population in 1851.
5 The 'great cities' defined here are those which had at least 50,000 
inhabitants by 1851. The sample selection is described in greater detail in 
G. Kearns, 'Le handicap urbain et le declin de la mortalite en Angleterre 
et au Pays de Galles, 1851-1900', Annales de Demographic Historique 1993, 
pp. 75-105. The figure for London 1832 actually refers to 1832-3, for 
Newcastle 1832 to 1831-2, and for Newcastle 1854 to 1853.
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The Liverpool epidemic of 1849 was of national as well as local 
importance. At its peak, from mid-August to mid-September, each 
day about sixty people died from cholera (see Figure I). 6 The 
General Board of Health anxiously demanded daily reports of 
cholera and diarrhoea deaths and cases from Duncan from late 
May to early October. It sent two of its Superintending Inspectors 
to the city on several occasions. One of these was Sutherland, a 
native of the city, and the other was Richard Grainger, of St 
Thomas's Hospital, London. National as well as local newspapers 
followed events in Liverpool, which at the time headed most of the 
mortality league tables with which Farr was embarrassing cities 
throughout the country. Duncan, at the time, was still reeling from 
the horror of inaugurating his tenure in the midst of perhaps the 
worst typhus epidemic of the century, was cajoling the 
Corporation to spend the money needed to make its legislative 
commitment to environmental reform a physical reality, was 
attempting to define the 'professional' status of his office, and was 
now required to manage this fledging public health system with 
only the services of a temporary clerk for the duration of the 
epidemic (appointed 21 June 1849, and given one month's notice 
on 2 7 December 1849). 7
Duncan was guided by his experience during the typhus 
epidemic of 1847 and by the expectation that, as the General 
Board of Health asserted in its first Notification of cholera, dated 5 
October 1848: 'whatever is preventive of cholera is equally 
preventive of typhus and of every other epidemic and constantly 
recurring disease'. 8 The Board 'warned the local authorities that 
the seats of the approaching pestilence in their respective 
districts, would be the usual haunts of other epidemics'. 9 
Cholera, then, was to be yet another exemplar of the general 
public health problem. It would behave in the same way as 
typhus and could be tackled with the same measures.
The data come from W. H. Duncan, Report to the Health Committee of the
Borough of Liverpool, on the health of tfie town during the years 1847 48 49 50,
and on other matters within his department (Liverpool, 1851), p. 30.
Liv. R.O., 352.MIN.HEA, 'Health Committee Minutes', vol. 2, 21 June
1849, p. 293; vol. 2, 27 Dec. 1849, p. 456.
Lancet (1848), vol. 2, p. 462.
P.E 1850 [1273] xxi, p. 3, 'Report from the General Board of Health on
the epidemic cholera of 1848 & 1849', p. 19.
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II
Duncan's understanding of the general public health problem 
evolved over the seventeen years between his first experience of 
cholera, as physician to Liverpool's North Dispensary, in 1832 
and his second, as the borough's Medical Officer of Health. To 
some extent he moved ever closer to Chadwick's version of the 
sanitary idea but he more or less eschewed moralistic emphases 
and he retained a stronger interest in housing than in 
Chadwick's promotion of sanitary engineering. Throughout, he 
relied heavily upon statistical evidence which he deployed with 
great care and not a little panache. 10 This, alone, would mark 
him off from Chadwick, who used statistical material more for 
illustration than exploration." The development of Duncan's 
thought on the environmental causes of disease provides an 
intriguing example of the competing claims of scientific and 
practical demands upon medical ideas. As Cooter showed in a 
study of the political ideology of anticontagionism, the nuances 
of the scientific debate in medical journals took on a different 
and even less important hue when set against the insistent, 
pragmatic demands of public health policy. 12 It was not only that 
the explanation of the aetiological and pathological mechanisms 
of disease were secondary and even irrelevant to the need to 
decide practical questions about restrictions on trade and 
movement, it was also that the policy questions about controlling 
people and the economy raised a set of quandaries in political 
philosophy on which scientific medicine had no purchase.
From the very beginning, Duncan was convinced of the value 
of medical statistics. In an early publication presenting a record 
for 1833 of the cases of sickness which he had treated at the 
North Dispensary during his twice-weekly attendance there, he 
remarked that:
10 See P. Laxton and G. Kearns, 'Statistics and the management of the 
public health: the methods of W. H. Duncan' (paper given by R Laxton 
at the annual conference of the Social Science History Association, 
Baltimore, 1993).
11 See M. J. Cullen, The statistical movement in early Victorian Britain: the 
foundations of empirical social science (Hassocks, 1975).
12 R. Cooter, 'Anticontagionism and history's medical record', in The 
problems of medical knowledge: examining the social construction of medicine, ed. P 
Wright and A. Treacher (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 87-108.
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The particulars with regard to age, sex, &c. are pretty well fully given, 
for I cannot agree with those who look upon such statistical details as of 
little value. If they have not hitherto been productive of much practical 
good, it is, I conceive, because Medical Statistics are a branch of the 
science which has been most unaccountably neglected; and were every 
individual who has opportunities of observation, to furnish his quota of 
facts, we might soon be enabled to make deductions having the most 
important bearing on the etiology and treatment of disease. 13
In his commentary on this table of sickness, Duncan paid 
attention to the distribution of sickness by age, sex, season and 
weather. He merely presented without comment some figures 
on the nationality and habitations of his patients which showed 
that 45% were Irish, 47% English and that 39% lived in courts, 
24% in cellars and 36% in front houses. Indeed, he commented 
directly on the relative unimportance of country of birth: 'I 
have not been able to generalise my observations on this head, 
nor perhaps, if reduced into form, would they point to any 
striking result'. 14 This is a world removed from the concerns of 
his writings in the 1840s. Here, in 1833, he was merely 
recording the natural rhythms of sickness.
Duncan never lost this interest in medicine as a branch of 
natural philosophy, although in the 1840s he laid greater stress 
upon the extent to which the causes of disease were physical 
and removable. Duncan became one of Chadwick's star 
witnesses. He gave evidence before Robert Slaney's 1840 Select 
Committee on the Health of Towns. Duncan described the 
population of Liverpool which lived in cellars and courts, and 
estimated that there were 38,000 people living in cellars and a 
further 86,000 in courts. None of the latter were sewered. 
Slaney pressed him: 'Are the Committee to understand that 
there are neither sewers nor underground drains in those 
courts? None whatever.' 15 His conception of the public health 
task in Liverpool related primarily to the regulation of these 
houses: 'I think that it would be the means of reducing the 
mortality of Liverpool very much if an efficient plan of
13 W. H. Duncan, 'Table of medical cases entered on Dr. Duncan"s Register 
at Liverpool North Dispensary, during the year 1833', Liverpool Medical 
Journal (1834), p. 18.
14 Duncan, Liverpool Medical Journal ( 1834), p. 18.
15 W. H. Duncan, 'Minutes of evidence', in P.P. 1840 (384) xi, p. 277, 
'Report from the Select Committee on the Health of Towns', p. 142.
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inspection were carried into effect; if power were vested in some 
officer or Board to regulate the dwellings of the poor.' 16 Duncan 
thought that little could be expected from the poor. In particular, 
he suggested that the Irish were generally apathetic and satisfied 
with their lot whatever that might be. He did not think that 
without extensive education, the poor would take any advantage 
of public baths were any to be provided. After he was led by 
William Cowper through a cost-benefit analysis of putting the 
courts in proper sanitary order, Duncan assured Slaney that: 'In 
the first instance, at all events, there would be great expense in 
putting those places in a habitable state; but I think in the end it 
would certainly diminish the poor-rates, and the necessity of relief 
to the people themselves, and to the widows and orphans of those 
that have died.' 17 He contributed a paper 'On the Sanitary State 
of Liverpool' to Chadwick's 1842 'Report on the Sanitary 
Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain'. In this 
paper, Duncan followed the example of Neil Arnott, James 
Phillips Kay and Thomas Southwood Smith who had reported 
in 1838 on the removable causes of fever for Chadwick at the 
Poor Law Commission. He distinguished between physical and 
moral factors but concentrated almost exclusively on the 
environment of working-class dwellings among the former and 
on the habits of the urban Irish as an instance of the latter. In his 
emphasis on housing Duncan was faithful to the model of public 
health reform pushed by Chadwick at the start of the decade in 
which building regulations were to be the vehicle for urban 
improvement. The report of 1842 marked Chadwick's move 
towards sanitary engineering as a more fundamental set of 
reforms, leaving many of his earlier supporters confused. 18 The 
crucial point of attack was now the urban atmosphere and the 
proposed strategy was a system of cleansing and ventilation. 19
16 P.E 1840 (384) xi, pp. 145-146.
17 P.E 1840 (384) xi, p. 147.
18 Lord Normanby, who had introduced a Building Bill into Parliament, was 
especially embarrassed by Chadwick's change of emphasis. See S. E. 
Finer, The life and times of Sir Edwin Chadwick (London, 1952), pp. 210-211.
19 On the ideological significance of the 'sanitary idea' as a coherent system, 
see P. Corrigan and D. Sayer, The great arch: English state formation as cultural 
revolution (Cambridge, 1985); G. Kearns, 'Private property and public 
health reform in England, 1830-70', Social Science and Medicine, XXVI 
(1988), pp. 187-199.
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Pickstone points to an important element of reductionism in 
the way Chadwick and Southwood Smith conceptualized 
urban fevers as the archetypal public health problem. Although 
an eclectic set of causes of fevers was noted, only a few of them 
were considered appropriate targets of intervention. In 
particular, the 'sanitary idea' separated private from public 
matters, restricting public health measures to the latter. Writing 
of the fever reports produced for the 1838 Report of the Poor 
Law Commission, he notes:
Many of the reported causes [of fever] were seen as aspects of'private' 
behaviour, and thus inappropriate objects for political action. For 
example, the overcrowding and intemperance of the poor were seen as 
'originating to a considerable extent in their habits'. But drains, cess 
pools, refuse, burial grounds and slaughter houses arose independently 
of these habits; these were public matters, hence they could be targeted 
for political action. 20
Whilst he followed this distinction between private and public, 
Duncan saw the latter primarily as a matter of 'dwellings'. He 
summarized the causes of fever as follows:
With regard to their dwellings, I would point out as the principal 
circumstances affecting the health of the poor:
1. Imperfect ventilation.
2. Want of places of deposit for vegetable and animal refuse.
3. Imperfect drainage and sewerage.
4. Imperfect system of scavenging and cleansing.
The circumstances derived from their habits most prejudicial to their 
health, I conceive to be:
1. Their tendency to congregate in too large numbers under the 
same roof, &c.
2. Want of cleanliness.
3. Indisposition to be removed to the hospital when ill of fever. 21
The conflation of questions of ventilation with those relating to 
the removal of decomposing waste suggests a sympathy with
20 J. V Pickstone, 'Dearth, dirt and fever epidemics: rewriting the history of 
British "public health", 1780 1850', in Epidemics and ideas: essays on the 
historical perception of pestilence, ed. T. Ranger and R Slack (Oxford, 1992), 
p. 137.
21 W. H. Duncan, 'On the sanitary state of Liverpool', in P.P. 1842 (HL) 
xxvii, p. 1, 'Local reports on the sanitary condition of the labouring 
population of England', pp. 283-284.
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Southwood Smith's emphasis on animal poisons proceeding 
directly from the living person and even for the attempt 'to 
abolish the distinction between the human body and external 
agents, and so present a fevered patient as merely a form of 
decomposition'. 22 Duncan is perhaps closer to Pickstone's 
reference to R. B. Howard's conception of 'human miasma' in 
that same set of Local Reports. 23 In other words, Duncan seems 
to imply that it is human beings themselves, and not just those 
with fever, who can pose a threat to public health when they are 
concentrated in the absence of adequate ventilation:
The influence of this cause is shown, I think, in the case of the cellars 
whose ventilation is more imperfect than that of the courts and houses, 
at the same time that they afford a much larger proportion of fever 
cases. Of the 5,000 cases annually treated by the dispensaries, nearly 
1,500 occur in cellars, being 35 per cent, more than the cellar 
population ought to yield, as compared with the working population.24
Duncan would always retain this emphasis on overcrowding 
and housing conditions in his understanding of the public 
health problem.
Duncan developed his ideas on the moral basis of ill-health 
through comments on the Irish in Liverpool, among whom one 
third of all sickness reported was from fever, compared only to 
one quarter in the case of their English neighbours:
Among the causes of fever in Liverpool, I might have enumerated the 
large proportion of poor Irish among the working population. It is they 
who inhabit the filthiest and worst-ventilated courts and cellars, who 
congregate the most numerously in dirty lodging-houses, who are the 
least cleanly in their habits, and the most apathetic about everything 
that befalls them. It is among the Irish that fever especially commits its 
ravages; and it is they who object the most strongly to be removed to 
the hospital from their miserable abodes. Nor does the evil stop with 
themselves. By their example and intercourse with others they are
22 Pickstone,'Fever epidemics', p. 146.
23 Pickstone, 'Fever epidemics', p. 134, referring to R. B. Howard, 'Report 
on the prevalence of diseases arising from contagion and certain other 
physical causes among the labouring classes in Manchester', in P.P. 1842 
(HL) xxvii, p. 1, 'Local reports on the sanitary condition of the labouring 
population of England', pp. 282-294.
24 Duncan, 'On the sanitary state of Liverpool', p. 285.
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rapidly lowering the standard of comfort among their English 
neighbours, communicating their own vicious and apathetic habits, and 
fast extinguishing all sense of moral dignity, independence and self- 
respect. No one interested in the welfare of his poor brethren can 
contemplate the prospect with a feeling of melancholy foreboding; and 
I am persuaded that so long as the native inhabitants are exposed to the 
inroads of numerous hordes of uneducated Irish, spreading physical 
and moral contamination around them, it will be in vain to expect that 
any sanitary code can cause fever to disappear from Liverpool. 25
This moralistic attack on the Irish poor, so dominant in the 
writings of Kay and Girdlestone in the 1830s,26 rarely surfaced 
to this extent in Duncan's later writings. In this piece for 
Chadwick's 1842 inquiry he was trying to urge that in its 
housing and in its population of Irish immigrants, Liverpool 
suffered in a particularly acute way from both the physical and 
the moral causes of sickness. In the case of both the physical 
and the moral factors, Duncan was trying to avoid the 
conclusion that disease was a direct consequence of poverty. A 
further radical transformation of poor-law provisions was not 
on the agenda for the public health reformers and they focused 
their efforts instead on the physical removable causes of 
mortality. Duncan's concern with the Irish was, however, a 
characteristic feature of debate over health in Liverpool. The 
local authorities repeatedly called for restrictions on 
immigration and just as frequently pointed to the health costs of 
the repeated denials of their demands. Augustus Campbell, 
speaking from the chair at a meeting of the Select Vestry in 
May 1849 bemoaned the fact that Liverpool 'has been made 
the hospital and cemetery for Ireland'. 27 Beyond the specific 
reference to the amorality of the poor Irish, there was little 
made of poverty in Duncan's explanation of disease.
Duncan was not inclined to accept the ultra-sanitarian line 
that organic decomposition generates fever. These miasmas could 
only extend themselves in epidemic form given certain 
atmospheric conditions, chiefly relating to electricity. The
25 Duncan, 'On the sanitary state of Liverpool', pp. 293-294.
26 See F. Mort, Dangerous sexualities: medico-moral politics in England since 1830 
(London, 1987).
27 Liverpool Mercury, 18 May 1849, p. 20.
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atmospheric condition is the factor which unites the effects of 
poor ventilation and overcrowding with those of poor drainage 
and inadequate rubbish removal.
Ill
A year after giving evidence to Chadwick's inquiry, Duncan 
wrote a paper evaluating Liverpool's new Local Improvement 
Act. 28 This was read before Liverpool's Literary and 
Philosophical Society on two evenings in February and March 
of 1843. It was subsequently published by the Society and an 
abridged version was printed in the First Report of the Health 
of Towns Commission in 1844. 29 In this pamphlet, he barely 
mentioned moral issues at all. Instead, he treated overcrowding 
as a physical cause of disease and although he referred to the 
deplorable habits of the Irish, he conceded that part of the 
difference between the English and the Irish 'is merely the 
result of their greater poverty'. 30 Observations about the Irish 
offer no basis for generalizations about the English poor law, it 
might appear. Duncan went on to suggest that since mortality 
was generally higher in town than in country and that wages 
showed the same pattern, poverty could provide no general 
explanation of urban mortality. The focus of the paper is the 
atmosphere of towns. Duncan quotes from William Farr's first 
Annual Report to the Registrar General: 'The source of the 
higher mortality in cities is ... in the insalubrity of the 
atmosphere.' 31 Far from wanting to examine the direct impact 
of moral causes on mortality, Duncan advised the reader that: 
'Wishing to adhere pretty closely to the object of the paper, i.e. 
to point out the physical causes of the high rate of mortality, 
&c., I have said nothing as to the very low rate of morality
28 5 and 6 Vict. c. xliv.
29 W. H. Duncan, On the physical causes of the high rate of mortality in Liverpool. 
Read before the Literary and Philosophical Society in February and Alarch, 1843 
(Liverpool, 1843); abridged in P.P. 1844 [572] xvii, p. 1, 'First Report of 
the Commissioners appointed for Inquiring into the State of Large 
Towns and Populous Districts. Appendix', pp. 12-32. Page references are 
to the pamphlet [hereafter Physical Causes].
30 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 56.
31 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 6.
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which many of these [physical] causes [such as overcrowding] 
tend to induce', 32 thereby treating morality itself as one more of 
the consequences of the physical causes of disease. One 
important reason why Duncan wanted to concentrate on the 
mephitic urban atmosphere and its physical causes was that it 
directed the attention of his middle-class audience to their own 
interest in sanitary reform. The pamphlet was certainly 
recognized locally as having materially promoted the sanitary 
cause. Even a decade later, the Liverpool Chronicle's sarcasm has 
something of the ring of truth about it: 'Dr. Duncan rose one 
morning and found himself famous by the publication of his 
pamphlet, showing that Liverpool was then the lowest as 
regarded longevity of any town in the kingdom. We took alarm 
and employed him to look after our health'. 33
Duncan insisted that the rich as well as the poor had higher 
mortality in town than in country: 'the influence of these seats 
of pestilence is not confined to those who reside within their 
immediate limits, but extends itself to the whole town, 
poisoning the atmosphere which all classes are compelled to 
breathe'. 34 He tried to awaken the sympathy of his audience 
with his graphic descriptions of the misery of the overcrowded 
courts, 'As some of the members present may not be 
acquainted with the character and construction of the courts 
in which so many of their townsmen reside'. 35 After an 
account of the extent to which the housing conditions of the 
poor supply physical causes of fever beyond the effects of 
poverty, he asked:
Does any one suppose that if the inhabitants of Rodney Street and 
Abercromby Square were to exchange places with those of Vauxhall or 
Exchange Wards, leaving their spacious mansions to be occupied by the 
inhabitants of the latter district, while they took up residence in the 
filthy and miserable courts and cellars, of Vauxhall or Exchange, their 
relative command of the necessaries of life remaining undisturbed  
does any one suppose that the relative mortality of the two classes 
would likewise remain unaltered?36
32 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 19.
33 Uvapool Chronicle, 27 May 1854, p. 7.
34 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 62.
35 Duncan, Physical Causes, pp. 9-10.
36 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 62.
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He even tried to shame his audience with the revelation that the 
Corporation was raising money from a general Sewers Rate to 
provide sewers only in the rich areas, leaving the poor without 
sewers, while even undeveloped plots in the suburbs had them. 
From a recent map produced by the Commission of Sewers in 
Liverpool, he calculated that only one fifth of the streets 
occupied chiefly by the working classes were sewered compared 
to fully three fifths of the rest of the city's built-up streets by 
length. 37 Duncan appeared to believe that his best hope lay in 
appealing to his audience's sense of self-preservation. Having 
described one appalling set of cellars with mud floors awash 
with the disgorged contents of privies and ashpits from an 
adjoining court, he paused to remark: 'I mention this instance 
in particular, because it may come more home to the members 
than others which might be adduced; for although they may 
never be called upon themselves to inhabit the cellars in 
question, it is possible they may be called upon to drink the 
milk or cream which has been stationed there'. 38
In this report, Duncan also tried to demonstrate the 
correlations between the physical causes he was speaking of and 
the sickness and mortality which they produced:
What has been already stated with regard to the high rate of mortality 
amongst us, and its physical causes, applied to Liverpool as a whole: but 
I have now to show that the mortality is distributed over the parish in 
very different proportions, and to point out in how far any connexion 
may be traced between the ratio of mortality in each district and the 
particular intensity with which those physical causes may there be 
found to operate. The subsequent Tables have been constructed with 
the view of facilitating the illustration of this important point. The 
materials from which they have been framed were derived from the 
enumerators' lists of the late census, with which I was favoured by Mr. 
Eckersley; the returns of the Corporation Surveyors with regard to the 
court and cellar residences; the map published by the Commissioners of 
Sewers; the records of the Dispensaries; and a list of the deaths in the 
different Registrar's districts of the parish, for two years, (1838 and 
1842), with which I have been obligingly furnished by the 
Superintendent Registrar [Eckersley]. 39
37 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 15.
38 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 14.
39 Duncan, Physical Causes, pp. 42-43. The mortality data relate to the 
registration subdistricts of Liverpool and involve some amalgamation of 
the wards. 1838 and 1842 were years of relatively light mortality.
Duncan and the Cholera Test 103
Table 3 presents a summary of some of the materials he 
assembled. The data are all shown as index values of the 
average of the parish as a whole, which is given at the foot of 
each column. The rank ordering of the registration subdistricts 
is not consistent across all these environmental indicators 
although the middle-class area of Rodney Street and Aber- 
cromby wards was consistently salubrious. The working classes 
were most likely to live in courts and cellars in VauxhalJ ward, 
were least well sewered in Saint Anne's and Lime Street, and 
were most likely to be found in damp cellars in Saint Paul's, 
Exchange and Castle Street wards, where they also lived at the 
greatest population and housing densities and where the higher 
proportion of courts were closed at both ends. Duncan, himself, 
worried about some of the data. He questioned the accuracy of 
the count of the population in courts and cellars: 'From pretty 
extensive data which I have in my possession, I should be 
inclined to think these numbers, both on the court and cellar 
population, to be under the mark; but as they profess to be from 
actual enumeration, I am of course bound to take them as I 
find them', and in a footnote he opined, 'Possibly, casual lodgers 
have been omitted in the enumeration'. 40 If this were true it 
would be a serious lacuna in the official census.
The multiplicity of interacting factors made it difficult to 
isolate the operation of any one but it also made it possible to 
explain almost any pattern of sickness and disease in terms of 
perfectly plausible hierarchies of physical causes. Duncan used 
the ratio between fever cases and population and the crude 
rate of mortality in the relatively mild years of 1838 and 1842 
as indicators of the consequences for health of the physical 
causes he had described. These are shown in Table 4, together 
with some later evidence from the early years of Duncan's 
tenure as Medical Officer of Health. 41 There are three striking 
features of this table which bear upon Duncan's account of the 
physical causes of disease. First, the differentiation between 
the component parts of Liverpool was relatively weak during 
years of moderate mortality. Second, the level of fever sickness 
1835-9 is actually a rather good predictor of the rank- 
ordering of fever mortality during the later (1847) epidemic.
40 Duncan, Physical Causes, p. 11.
41 Duncan, Report, 1847-48-49-50, pp. 13, 32, 86.
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Third, the disparity between high and low mortality was rather 
less in the case of cholera than in the case of fever, in this being 
rather similar to diarrhoeal mortality more generally. In fact, 
the ranking of the subdistricts is remarkably consistent across all 
disease categories. We may note in passing that the only one of 
Duncan's physical causes which picks out Vauxhall as the pre- 
eminent disease nest is the percentage of the population living 
in courts and cellars, a housing variable.42
TABLE 3 The distribution of the physical causes of disease by ward 
(Liverpool parish = 100)
Ward(s)______(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Vauxhall 170 105 105 99 93 75 102 64 109
St Pauls,
Exchange, 105 201 109 134 97 100 104 56 114
Castle Street
St Peters,
PittSt, 79 91 106 120 118 120 114 83 112
Great George
StAnnes, 99 114 98 78 91 30 88 81 88 
Lime St
Scotland 118 48 96 80 99 115 84 150 94
Jbtromby 65 12 83 43 103 125 104 188 88 
Parish 34.3 31.8 5.2 44.4 3.3 20 57 30.7 6.8
Note: Each variable is expressed as a ratio to the value for Liverpool parish. 
The variables are: (1) the percentage of the population living in courts or 
cellars; (2) the percentage of courts which were closed at both ends; (3) the 
inhabitants per house in court housing; (4) the percentage of cellars found to 
be damp; (5) the inhabitants per cellar; (6) the percentage of the length of 
working class streets which were sewered; (7) the percentage of the length of 
other streets which were sewered; (8) the surface area per inhabitant, in square 
yards; (9) the inhabitants per house.
42 In line with his focus on physical causes, Duncan did not explore nativity 
or poverty as explanations of the consistently observed ranking of 
subdistricts for the different diseases.
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TABLE 4 The distribution of disease by ward (Liverpool parish   100) 
Ward(s) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vauxhall 203 132 258 193 191
St Pauls,
Exchange, 148 101 117 108 125
Castle St
St Peters,
PittSt, 99 99 97 103 80
Great George
StAnnes, 51 98 52 55 68 
Lime St
Scotland . 72 98 97 125 131
Rodney St 24 ^ 28 ^ ^ Abercromby
Total 17.91 32.31 14.00 7.74 17.04
JVbfc: Each variable is expressed as a ratio to the value for Liverpool parish. 
The variables are: (1) the annual average number of fever cases per thousand 
population 1835-9; (2) average crude rate of mortality (deaths per thousand 
living) of 1838 and 1842; (3) fever mortality, 1847; (4) diarrhoea and 
dysentery, 1847; (5) cholera, 1849.
IV
If the removable causes of disease were those which encouraged 
the urban fevers, then, since it produced the greatest disparity 
between high mortality and low mortality subdistricts, the 
typhus epidemic of 1847 might have offered Duncan a more 
precise object lesson than the cholera epidemic of two years 
later. This was, indeed, the conclusion which Duncan reached: 
'The cholera was more widely diffused than the Irish fever, and 
was less affected by sanatory measures, being oftener found in 
healthy situations than the fever was; though, on the whole, it
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was chiefly congregated in the crowded parts.'43 To William 
Farr, Duncan expressed his consternation:
Cholera has altogether left us, after having existed as an epidemic 
nearly five months and caused a greater mortality than I had 
anticipated, considering the improved sanitary conditions of the town 
within the last few years. I am inclined to think that cholera is more 
dependent on influences beyond our control than typhus fever is; that 
the 'atmospheric constitution' is an element of more power in the former 
epidemic, and that it has been lost sight of by the [General] Board of 
Health when they talk of extinguishing the epidemic. I am persuaded 
that no house-to-house visitation could shorten the duration of the 
epidemic by a single day, however much it might circumscribe its 
ravages. About 10,000 of the worst houses in Liverpool were daily 
visited but cholera carried off 5,000 of our people. 44
Duncan was a recognized authority on urban epidemics and 
Farr was only one among several reformers who sought his 
reflections on cholera. Farr directed Duncan's attention to 
what Farr took to be an iron law of cholera, that there was an 
inverse correlation between elevation and mortality. Farr was 
anxious to derive practical conclusions from empirical 
correlations independently of vexatious disputes about disease 
aetiology. 45 Duncan offered Farr none of the certainty of 
statistical inference that he sought. Only at the most 
aggregated of levels (combining sixteen Liverpool districts into 
three altitudinal bands) did 'the results distinctly point to the
43 \V. H. Duncan, 'Report of the Officer of Health on the Cholera in 
Liverpool' [Read before the Liverpool Medical and Pathological Society, 
1 Nov. 1849], London Medical Gazette, New Series vol. 9 (1849), pp. 
1102-1105, p. 1103.
44 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1/1, f. 262, Duncan to Farr, 13 Nov. 1849. This 
letter is contained in the first of Duncan's three letter books (Liv. R.O. 
252 HEA 1/1-3) which are currently being edited by Kearns and 
Laxton for publication. They amount to over 1,000 documents on 1,417 
leaves of tissue copies whose legibility is in places extremely poor. The 
collection is far from complete but some further letters have been found 
in other archives and local newspapers. For a nice sketch of the 
correspondence see W. M. Frazer, Duncan of Liverpool: being an account of the 
work of Dr. W. H. Duncan, Medical Officer of Health of Liverpool, 1847-1863 
(London, 1947).
45 See M. Felling, Cholera, fever and English medicine, 1825-1865 (Oxford, 
1978), p. 109.
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relation between the elevation of the soil and the mortality 
from cholera', whereas 'Taking the districts singly, where the 
difference of elevation is only 2 or 3 feet, I find the Law is not 
carried out, being apparently overpowered by disturbing 
elements.'46
Cholera did not seem to be the exemplar of the public 
health problem that the General Board of Health assured 
everyone it was. In some ways, the conceptual space for this 
divergence of views may have been opened up for Duncan by 
his adherence to a more eclectic, in Pickstone's terms, theory 
of urban fevers in general. The introduction of atmospheric 
effects enabled Duncan to postulate that different urban 
diseases had distinct aetiologies. Duncan diverged from the 
thinking of the General Board of Health in four ways. First, 
and least significantly, in the General Board's First Notification of 
5 October 1848, the public had been enjoined to avoid green 
vegetables and any food likely to promote looseness of the 
bowels. This scant bill of advice had been dallied over by 
Southwood Smith and then rushed to completion by 
Chadwick. 47 In the handbill which Duncan drew up for 
distribution in Liverpool (20,000 were passed out to the 
working classes of the city in mid 1849),48 he gave 'simple 
directions and advice as to cleanliness, ventilation, avoidance 
of damp about their buildings, removal of nuisances, dirt, 
temperance, etc.'49 No mention was made of diet. Indeed at a 
meeting of the Health Committee on 14 June, Duncan was 
specifically asked to issue a note of dietary advice to the poor 
but he refused, saying that he 'was of the opinion that food had 
little or nothing to do with cholera'.50 The advice about diet 
was largely irrelevant to Chadwick's preventive preoccupations 
and may have represented little more than a misjudged 
attempt to placate the medical profession with the inclusion of 
what he imagined was one of their central concerns. 51
46 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1/1, ff. 514-515, Duncan to Farr, 15 May 1852.
47 Finer, Chadwick, p. 340.
48 Liverpool Courier, 16 June 1849, p. 3.
49 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1/1, f. 72, Duncan to Thomas Shapter of Exeter, 13 
July 1849.
50 Liverpool Chronicle, 16 June 1849, p. 3.
51 On the opposition of some of the medical profession to this advice, see 
Finer, Chadwick, p. 340.
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More importantly, Duncan took up the three areas where, 
according to Felling, the London medical journals found fault 
with the General Board: 'the specificity of disease, the nature of 
epidemic influence, and the question of contagion'. 52 Taking 
the last first, it is clear that Duncan became early convinced 
that cholera was occasionally contagion. In February 1849, 
while admitting that it was 'not a very scientific idea', he said 
that recent cases had persuaded him that there was a risk of 
contagion after death and that 'from what he had seen of the 
few cases here, he considered it quite right to adopt precautions, 
and to act as if the disease was contagious. His opinion was still 
that as a general rule, and under ordinary circumstances, the 
disease was not contagious'. 53 By November, he was convinced 
of the facts if not the explanation:
Cholera is contagious in certain cases, if favoured by certain concurring 
circumstances; but its spread by contagion is the exception, not the rule. 
Many washerwomen, residing in healthy parts, to whom the linen of 
cholera patients had been sent, died. 54
This suggestion, repeated on many sides, was dismissed with 
characteristic special pleading in the General Board of Health's 
report on the epidemic, where it was argued that in no case 
could all possible environmental causes of cholera be excluded. 
After examining the circumstances of ten cases of cholera 
among washerwomen, Dr Waller Lewis concluded for the 
General Board of Health that:
The attack can be at least as well assigned to other causes as to the 
alleged one [contagion]... In nearly every instance the condition of the 
house and the street or court inhabited by the patient was of the most 
dangerous description.55
This was the quality of reasoning which led Farr, when he 
detected it in the work of Florence Nightingale, to admonish
52 Felling, Cholera, p. 75.
53 Liverpool Mercury, 2 Feb. 1849, p. 80, reporting the proceedings of the 
Health Committee meeting of 1 Feb.
54 Duncan,'Cholera in Liverpool', p. 1103.
55 RE 1859 [1275] xxi, p. 367, Appendix B to the Report of the General 
Board of Health on the epidemic cholera of 1848 and 1849. Report by 
Mr. Grainger', pp. 186-187.
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her to think scientifically and not merely to 'Chadwickize'. 56 
Duncan had even anticipated the objection in referring 
specifically to washerwomen 'residing in healthy parts'. He 
presented his conclusions more fully in a later report:
The experience of the late epidemic has modified in some measure the 
opinion generally entertained by the medical profession as to the non- 
contagious character of the disease. For myself, after much experience 
of the epidemic during its former as well as its later visit to Liverpool, I 
am of opinion that while an individual may inhabit with impunity even 
the same room with a cholera patient, provided he abstain from 
absolute contact with the secretions, it is dangerous to handle the body 
after death or to wash the linen or bedclothes of the deceased. 37
There were two reasons why Duncan was reluctant to concede 
the possibility of contagion. First, interpersonal transmission of 
disease left little space for Duncan's physical causes or their 
atmospheric effects. Without this, the basis of his advocacy of 
environmental improvements seemed weaker and he might be 
back with a public health policy based on quarantine rather 
than sanitation. Second, as a local official, Duncan was keen to 
avoid stirring up fears of contagion, a point made by Harbord 
to a meeting of the Council's Health Committee right at the 
start of the epidemic. 58 The two were related, for the broader 
fear of contagion in foreign ports meant that at the first 
mention of cholera being in town, epidemic or not, the foreign 
consuls sent back to their countries the newspaper reports of the 
Health Committee's weekly counts of deaths and Liverpool 
ships were subjected to quarantine and all manner of people 
avoided coming to town to do business. 59
This sensitivity to the commercial implications of health 
policy was thought to be particularly strong among the group 
dubbed by Farr 'the Liverpool squadron'. 60 Sutherland, for one, 
was proud of the resolute anticontagionism of his Liverpool
56 J. Eyler, Victorian social medicine: the ideas and methods of William Farr 
(London, 1979), p. 188.
57 Duncan, Report, 1847-48-49-50, p. 39.
58 Liverpool Chronicle, 3 Feb. 1849, p. 3, reporting the meeting of 1 Feb.
59 Liverpool Journal, 9 June 1849, p. 2, reporting the Health Committee 
meeting of 7 June.
60 B.L. Add. MS. 45751 (Nightingale Papers), f. 140d, Farr to Sutherland, 
30 Oct. 1859.
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colleagues. He complained at one point (in 1859) to Nightingale 
that the National Association for Social Science's Committee 
on Quarantine (created by Gavin Milroy at a meeting in 
Liverpool) contained 'all the most devoted contagionists in 
Europe', plus Milroy, 'who is in a transition state': 'All doctors 
you will observe, & all London doctors & the people are to 
report on a purely commercial matter, namely Quarantine. 
There is not a Liverpool man on it & not a single merchant'. 61 
After reading Milroy's pamphlet of 1853, written from his 
experience as an Inspector with the General Board of Health, 
Duncan had written: 'In your views on this subject I think I 
entirely concur'. 62 What probably disappointed Sutherland by 
1859 was Milroy's movement towards a position of contingent 
contagionism on, at least, typhus and plague (among the more 
important diseases for international quarantine regulations), 
whereas Sutherland thought only the most extreme 
anticontagionism would bring the whole quarantine system 
crashing down. Milroy had written that 'There is ... [a] group of 
zymotic diseases in which the infectious property ... is only 
conditional and contingent, i.e., depending upon, and requiring 
for its manifestation, the coexistence of an artificially polluted 
atmosphere'. 63 The point is that Duncan's worries about the 
limits of anticontagionism were framed by precisely the same 
concerns about the commercial perils of quarantine on which 
Sutherland laid such stress. But Duncan was not willing to 
explain away the apparent occasions of contagion in order. He 
adopted a very limited version of contingent contagionism which 
specified quite narrowly the contingent circumstances necessary 
for the infectious transmission of the disease from the sick or 
dead to the well.
The second of the three issues that Felling draws attention to 
is the 'nature of the epidemic influence'. Once again, for the 
General Board of Health, this seemed to be a way of avoiding 
having quarantine follow as an implication of admitting
61 B.L. Add. MS. 45751, f. 126, Sutherland to Nightingale, Sept.f?] 1859.
62 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1/2, f. 45, Duncan to Milroy, 22 Oct. 1853.
63 G. Milroy, 'Quarantine as it is, and as it ought to be' Transactions of the 
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 1858 (London, 1859), 
p. 525. This position of contingent contagionism has been described in 
Felling, Cholera, p. 18.
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contagion. Instead, certain atmospheric conditions were seen as 
enabling miasmas to extend themselves very rapidly in ways 
which looked like contagious spread. Since the epidemic 
atmosphere was local it could not be excluded by quarantine. 
The physical disturbances of the atmosphere which promoted 
this extension might be meteorological, considered broadly to 
include electricity and magnetism. Sutherland wrote of 'the 
poison which propagates cholera in an epidemic atmosphere as 
being truly zymotic'. 64 For Duncan, the crucial question was the 
relationship between the local removable causes of disease, the 
miasma, and the atmospheric influence. He believed the first 
two to be linked and thus the miasmas to be to a great extent 
preventable, but the last he considered to be both beyond 
control and extremely important in the case of cholera. This 
explained his failure to contain the disease and revealed the 
hollow nature of the General Board of Health's boasts to have 
an infallible means of extinguishing it.
Writing to a Dr Head at Hanley who had requested his views 
on the contagiousness of cholera, Duncan forwarded his report 
on the years 1847-50 and summarized his personal views in a 
letter:
You will observe that I believe the disease to be propagated, as a rule, 
by some atmospheric influence whose nature is as yet undetermined, 
and which requires some predisposing cause as filth, moisture, or 
overcrowding, to call it into action, more particularly in certain stages 
of the epidemic. The history of cholera outbreaks is conclusive, in my 
opinion, against the idea of contagion being, as a rule, the mode of 
propagation. But there are exceptional cases which it is difficult to 
explain on any other supposition than that the disease does, in certain 
circumstances, become contagious, these instances, however, being so 
rare and so limited in application (to the nurse or washerwoman where 
death takes place) as to justify us in considering it practically as non- 
contagious. 65
In September 1852, when the General Board of Health was 
concerned that the prevalence of cholera in Poland might 
herald a new cholera season, Duncan drew the same conclusion 
from the rapid increase in infant diarrhoea, 'owing, I think, to
64 Quoted in Felling, Cholera, p. 66.
65 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1/2, ff. 71-72, Duncan to Head, 23 Nov. 1853.
112 Kearns, Laxton and Campbell
the warmth and peculiar electrical condition of the 
atmosphere'. 66 He also explained the supposed presence of 
cholera on board a ship in much the same way: 'I think it 
probable that the ship had passed through a stratum of 
atmosphere charged with cholera poison'. 67 In another case, he 
issued a warning to the Government Emigration Agent at 
Liverpool, a Lieutenant Hodd, that ships which went around 
the north coast of Ireland would very likely pass through such a 
'cholera cloud' and he advised their taking a different route.68
This concern with the physical basis of the atmospheric 
preconditions for cholera epidemics reaches back to his early 
interest in the effect of seasons on disease and his frequent 
remarks on the importance of changes in the weather in 
explaining the rise and fall of sickness. In 1849, he had written 
to Hartnup at the Liverpool Observatory:
I am sorry to find you have no electrical apparatus.
I had hoped that the results would have thrown some light on the 
alleged connection of epidemic cholera with particular states of 
atmospheric electricity. 69
These atmospheric features were beyond the reach of sanitation 
and compromised any claim that might be made that public 
health authorities could eliminate cholera. Yet this was precisely 
the claim made by the General Board of Health. They argued 
that a proper system of house-to-house visitation would find the 
cases of premonitory diarrhoea, all of which could be prevented 
from passing into cholera, thus snuffing out the epidemic. But 
Duncan believed that house-to-house visitation: 'did not prevent 
the continuance of the disease, but did no doubt check its 
ravages, by preventing cases from becoming confirmed cholera. 
There is no evidence in this town in favour of the important, the 
all-important influence, attached to it by the [General] Board of 
Health'. 70 In reply to a direct question from the General Board,
66 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1 /1, ff. 538-539, Duncan to Edward Parker, 8 Sept. 
1852.
67 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1/1, f. 532, Duncan to the Secretary of the General 
Board of Health, 26 Aug. 1852.
68 Liverpool Mercury, 9 Feb. 1849, p. 142.
69 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1 /1, f. 97, Duncan to Hartnup, 25 July 1849.
70 Duncan, 'Cholera in Liverpool', p. 1103.
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'Will you state your opinion of the efficacy of house [-to-house] 
visitation as a preventative against cholera?', Duncan replied, 
'Very efficacious in distinguishing the number of cases, but no 
power to extinguish the epidemic'. 71 He was equally blunt in his 
published report: 'the system has no power to extinguish the 
epidemic, as it has been thought to have, a result which no 
human means can bring about so long as the cholera poison 
continues to float in the atmosphere'. 72
Sutherland's 'epidemic effect', intended to close the policy 
door against quarantine, in fact opened wider the door on the 
very eclecticism which posed such a serious challenge to the 
certainties of the General Board. Felling writes of the main 
challenge to Chadwick's position coming from an insistence on 
'the principle of specificity in epidemic disease'. 73 The 
systematic nature of Chadwick's attack on the public health 
problem depended upon the urban mortality penalty being the 
product of a particular set of interlinked removable causes 
which could be targeted through a single strategy of sanitary 
engineering. If there were instead a variety of specific diseases 
with an array of diverse causes, then the attack on the problem 
ran the risk of dissipating into a guerrilla war of piecemeal 
measures easily frustrated by the patient and persistent 
opposition of vested interests. Yet this is precisely what seemed 
to be happening to Duncan's conception of the sanitary idea. 
Cholera did not bear out the unmediated operation of the 
physical causes of disease. Typhus did so more directly:
The two epidemics of fever and cholera afford some striking points of 
contrast. First, in their mode of propagation; fever spreading by 
contagion from district to district, until it covered the whole town; 
cholera apparently dependent upon atmospheric influences, appearing 
almost simultaneously in different localities; the one reveling amidst 
filth and overcrowding; the other, while evincing a decided predilection 
for such conditions, affording at the same time numerous exceptions to 
the rule, and attacking individuals and places not generally supposed 
obnoxious to the attacks of fever: the latter being thus more decidedly 
than cholera under the control of sanatory measures. 74
71 Liv. R.O. 252 HEA 1/1, f. 312, Duncan to the Secretary of the General 
Board of Health, 10 Jan. 1850.
72 Duncan, Report, 1847-48-49-50, p. 46.
73 Felling, Cholera, p. 79.
74 Duncan, Report, 1847-48-49-50, p. 38.
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Duncan refused to cling to the Chadwickian certainties, then, 
partly in order to protect himself against the Health Com- 
mittee's manifest failure to control cholera but also because he 
recognized too many anomalies in the reduction of all urban 
epidemics to the same fundamental set of principles.
Duncan, who was as committed as anyone to the explanation 
of disease in terms of physical causes, ended up accepting that 
epidemic diseases were quite specific in their aetiology and that, 
under certain circumstances, cholera was clearly contagious. He 
resisted readings of the disease which might appear to allow 
quarantine as a policy response and shared with Sutherland a 
belief in a set of poorly-specified atmospheric effects which 
brought the new account of the ecology of working-class life 
back within a framework which emphasized the seasonal 
rhythms and temporal swings in disease. This was in Pickstone's 
terms an integration of temporal and spatial frames of 
reference. 70 It was also a framework which was eclectic not only 
in its explanation of fever, but also in its conception of the public 
health problem, for what characterizes Duncan from beginning 
to end is a resolute focus on the quality of Liverpool's housing, 
whatever shifts there may have been in Chadwick's own 
understanding of the fundamental ecological systems of urban 
life. In fact, like John Simon in London, Duncan found that the 
practical requirements of improving the public health brought 
him back to the housing issue time and again. As Lambert 
judiciously remarks, it was 'Not that Chadwick and his followers 
were unaware of the housing problem; but, in concentrating on 
the arterial system, water supply and burials, they had tended to 
let the more insoluble question of housing, so much to the fore in 
1838-40, slip into secondary importance [by 1849]'. 76
Duncan's experience of fighting cholera led him to discover 
some of the rigidities of the Chadwickian system from within. His 
appointment and his general outlook were heavily influenced by 
the emphasis on removable physical causes of disease promoted 
by Chadwick. Yet that system could not explain or accommodate 
the persistence of sanitary problems in Liverpool or the
75 Pickstone, 'Fever', p. 126.
76 R. Lambert, Sir John Simon, 1816-1904, and English social administration 
(London, 1963), p. 148.
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stubbornly high mortality it experienced from cholera. That 
mismatch was to dog Duncan throughout his tenure and he 
eventually washed his hands of London's 'sanitary censors' and 
their efforts to hold him to an unrealistic set of expectations based 
on a superficial reading of the resilience of the public health 
problem in Liverpool. 77 This went as much for Chadwick as for 
Farr, Simon and Greenhow. Liverpool's local circumstances 
received scant consideration from any of them. Local studies 
might at least make some amends for that.
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